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Between the Fifties and the Seventies there was a gradual, cross-discipline discovery of a 
somewhat mysterious topic, namely, scientific models, analogies, and metaphors (See 
Hesse 1967; 1980; Granger 1967). The discovery was a typical multiple discovery, being 
carried out in a somewhat parallel way by Anglo-Saxon philosophers of science and by 
francophone philosophers and linguists. Claims to priority are still as open as with any 
respectable discovery: the Anglo-Saxon philosophers started repeating somewhat 
clumsily what well-known representatives of the Anglo-Saxon New Rhetoric such as 
Ivor A. Richards had already said brilliantly in the Thirties and Forties, while respectable 
philosophers of science such as Max Black (1962) were acclaimed as discoverers of what 
had been more aptly illustrated by less orthodox figures such as Stephen Pepper, Colin 
Turbayne, Philip Wheelwright, and after them David Schon. Besides, even if the 
philosophers of science – as an act of rebellion against dismal Logical Empiricist and 
Popperian orthodoxy from the Fifties when the warning was still circulating that “the 
price for the use of models is perpetual vigilance” (Braithwaite 1953: 93) –  gave analogy 
full citizenship in all phases of scientific discovery and justification, they nevertheless 
believed in a neat distinction between analogy, something fully rational and treatable in 
formal terms, and metaphor, which was hopelessly vague and a stranger to the realm of 
science. For example, Mary Hesse in the Fifties was still cautioning against an “analogy" 
which “has degenerated into a metaphor” (Hesse 1954: 144-145; emphasis added). The 
French parallel discovery had some more interesting aspects, still ignored by Anglo 
scholars. The main new idea was that of making metaphor, as opposed to metonymy, 
not to analogy, the mark of scientific discourse, in contrast to myth and ideology 
(Granger 1967; 1960), and turning scientific modelling and analogical reasoning into 
special cases of metaphorical thinking. The fruitfulness of the choice resulted from the 
fact of making representing and creating conceptual networks the core of scientific 
discourse (Cremaschi 1987), avoiding completely the shoals of pre-theoretical analogy 
and similarity as ‘objective’ but mysterious preconditions of legitimate use of scientific 
analogy into which the Anglo post-empiricist skippers went stranded (Cremaschi 1988).  
The subject-matter of Shelley’s book is an aspect of analogical reasoning that has 
been overlooked until now, namely the case for multiple analogies. It was a somewhat 
embarrassing topic. For, granted that the starting point of the discussion had been 
Braithwaite’s concession of a limited use of models in a preliminary phase, an unspoken 
premise still lingered around for a while, namely that an analogy is something slightly 
confused and should be admitted only provisionally, in order to turn it into some sort of 
clearly defined formal correspondence. Multiple analogies as such are a disturbing 
phenomenon for such strategies, and besides, mixed metaphor has always been despised 
by literary critics as an expression of a style which is baroque, in the pejorative sense of 
the term. 
Shelley starts with a definition of analogy as a somewhat deeper comparison 
between different things that may “serve some purpose or purposes, of which 
persuasion is only one” and is “based on deep connections between things rather than 
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some simple surface similarities such as physical resemblance” (p. 2). A multiple analogy 
is one such comparison where the source analogs, or the things with which something is 
compared, are more than one. Such kind of analogy becomes interesting if we drop the 
simpler view of analogy as a kind of induction (that – I add – was the typical Logical 
Empiricist view from the Fifties) and begin to view analogy in general in terms of 
“shared structure”. Theories that understand analogy in these terms, or Multi-constraint 
theories, take analogy to consist in a direct comparison of two conceptual structures, 
emphasizing the presence of  “mappings or alignments of hierarchically structured, 
causal relationships shared between source and target analogs” (p. 7); furthermore, they 
provide a criterion for “good analogies”, namely those that “contain mappings between 
richly structured, higher-order relations” (p. 7). typically causal relations.  
Analogies such as that between the Maltusian struggle for survival among newly 
born humans and the Darwinian struggle for survival among species have three traits: 
structural consistency, i.e., the extent to which the analogy constitutes an isomorphism; 
semantic similarity, i.e., the extent to which mappings connect elements that are 
perceptually or semantically similar to each other; and purpose, i.e., the extent to which 
information built up in the target conceptual structures contributes to the solution of the 
problem at hand. It is important to note that the two former requirements are soft ones, 
that is their fulfilment is required as much as possible, not in absolute terms, whereas the 
third is a kind of a touchstone, since – as Wartofsky (1979) noted – everything is similar 
to everything else, given a suitable viewpoint and purpose. Let me add that introducing 
“purpose” as one of the three requirements clears the field from idle talk about pre-
theoretical similarity, which drove the discussion of the Fifties and Sixties into a 
deadlock: 
 
Predicates from multiple source analogs may simply be placed into many-to-one 
mappings with the target analog where those sources are independent of each 
other. In cases where all the source analogs are coherent, this situation simply 
increases confidence that the target conceptual structure is well-founded. In cases 
where some source analogs lead to incoherencies, this situation may be described 
as an attempt to repair the problem by supplementation. These situations may be 
accounted for in the MT [= Multiconstraint Theory] by allowing multiple 
mappings to be put in place in the appropriate way (pp. 32-33). 
 
Shelley argues that multiple analogies have been widely used by philosophers in 
the course of history without realizing or admitting what they were actually doing, and 
are a widespread procedure in everyday scientific research. These claims are illustrated by 
case studies in two ‘soft’ sciences – evolutionary biology and archaeology – and in 
philosophy. These studies seem indeed to “make important contributions to the conduct 
of evolutionary biology, archaeology and philosophy”, thus allowing to conclude that the 
improvement of “our understanding of multiple analogies allows us to improve our 
understating of the aims and methods of sophisticated thinkers in these fields of inquiry” 
(p. 135).  
Coming to more specific claims, the first is that a theory of analogy should take 
multiple analogies as the default case and treat single analogies as special cases. Another 
is that, starting with multiple analogies, a number of cognitive issues arise that were not 
previously under focus, namely: confidence in the analogy that the procedure adopted is 
meant to produce; independence of the analogs, i.e., the requirement that knowledge of 
one analog does not immediately entail knowledge of any others; supplementation, i.e., 
the process of using one source analog to override others, or a constrained application of 
composition and completion; and specificity, i.e., a way in which purpose and target 
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interact, or the way in which source analogs and target predicates are selected in order to 
best serve the purpose of the analogy.  
A third claim is that kinds of representation do influence the cognitive power of 
analogies, and verbal representation is apt for performing some cognitive tasks while 
visual and narrative representation better fit other tasks. A fourth claim is that the 
purpose or the specific reasons why an analogy is drawn contribute in determining its 
meaning and cognitive content. 
The book has six chapters. The first describes the general theoretical framework. 
The second and third discuss one of the three case studies: that of evolutionary biology; 
the fourth deals with archaeology; the fifth with philosophy or, better, one of the seminal 
texts of the western philosophical tradition, Plato’s Republic. The sixth takes over the 
general theoretical discussion and concludes with a number of suggestions that have 
already been summarized. 
In order to give the reader a bit of the tenor of the case studies, let me start with 
the apparently more obvious one – Plato. Scholars have investigated Plato’s analogies, 
but they have been looking for something less than what was there to be found. In other 
words, what historians of ancient philosophy had learned about analogy made it consist 
in the scholastic analogy of proportion, as contrasted with analogy of attribution. Note 
that the Logical Empiricists too believed that analogy is proportion, and this is why they 
overlooked most analogies as vague qualitative similarities, to be condoned only in some 
preliminary, pre-scientific phase, and dismissed any relationship between analogy and 
metaphor. Plato scholars underemphasized the significance of most of the analogies used 
by Plato. For example, Plato compared the soul to eyes, ear, and pruning knives, and 
justice to bodily health. However, according to Shelley, he proper framework within 
which such comparisons are to be understood is Plato’s myth of the cave, where he 
explicitly admits that his own method is to make the truth arise out of interaction 
between two different ideas so that one idea clarifies the other and vice versa. 
“Constructing and understanding the multiple analogy between health, sickness, virtue 
and vice, then, is a miniature version of the philosophical method expounded in the 
analogy of the cave. Both involve bringing about a direct confrontation with a fire 
representing the concept of justice or the Good” (p. 112). 
Let me come to the most unquestionably ‘scientific’ field studied in the book – 
evolutionary biology. Besides the classical examples of the discovery of blood circulation 
by Harvey and of natural selection by Darwin, there are less known examples such as 
that of colecanth – the living fossil discovered in the twentieth century. Questions about 
the place where it lives and how it reproduces were answered through analogical 
argument by comparison with other species, and all the arguments that have been 
actually employed satisfy fairly well the requirements of MT. A similar case is made for 
‘real’ fossils such as Archaeopterix. 
In archaeology issues such as the explanation of the nature of marks on 
prehistoric pots from Peru, or the significance of figurine legs from Greece, or the 
discussion of the hypothesis that North Americans did hunt mammoths have also been 
resolved by using of multiple analogies. 
A few concluding remarks. The choice of two typically non-hard sciences as a 
source of case studies is peculiar and yet stimulating. The standard view of the Fifties was 
grounded in a commonplace view of physics, that now – after the sociology of scientific 
knowledge – looks, to say the least, obsolete. The model of scientific theorizing built on 
such ground was used after that in order to colonize other fields. One the favourite 
targets were psychoanalysis and other pseudo-sciences and, while nobody ever doubted 
that biology was a serious enterprise, it somehow had no appeal to philosophers of 
science. Archaeology used to enjoy an even more uncertain status: was it a science or a 
discipline from the humanities, and if the former, then should it adopt a deductive form 
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of argumentation? (p. 67). Shelley’s useful explorations of fields such as these may prove 
enlightening in order to come back to what were labelled the hard sciences with some 
more wisdom. 
A remark is in order also about analogy and metaphor. The commonplace 
identification of analogy with analogy of proportion is, curiously enough, a shared trait 
of both Logical Empiricism and the last phase of Scholasticism. Analogy of attribution 
or metaphor may prove a more fruitful alternative as an umbrella concept, under which 
we could group together several kinds of analogies: multiple, individual, “pre-
theoretical”, or entrenched in full-blooded theories. 
A third remark, or sympathetic criticism, is that literature from fields that have 
been apparently ignored in the book may provide useful suggestions in order to expand 
and strengthen the book’s main line of argument. I mean French epistemologists such as 
Gaston Bachelard, Gilles-Gaston Granger, Michel Serres, American authors associated 
with the New Rhetoric, American Post-empiricist philosophers of science such as 
Thomas Kuhn and Marx Wartofsky.  
Another remark concerns pragmatics. The claim made in the book that the 
purpose of an analogy contributes in determining its meaning and cognitive content is 
tantamount to the claim that no purely semantic theory of metaphor is available and the 
very distinction between literal and non literal meaning presupposes the pragmatic 
dimension of language (see Searle 1979: 92-123; Dascal 1984: 154-158). Several 
suggestions made in the book to the effect that the sociology of science is important for 
determining the expansion of single analogies into multiple ones may be further 
expanded in the light of the idea that practitioners of a scientific discipline too do things 
with words, e.g., they help their friends and fight their enemies, or, in other words, they 
are constantly engaged in controversies. And controversies do change theories, concepts, 
and descriptions of phenomena (see Cremaschi and Dascal 1998).  
Last but not least, pragmatism. The claim that the purpose of an analogy 
contributes in determining meaning and cognitive content seems to me to amount to the 
old lesson of pragmatism applied to analogy And perhaps an exploration of suggestions 
on the role of analogy by Peirce could prove a way of enriching the path of inquiry 
pointed at in this book. The multiple constraints model probably summarizes an idea of 
Peirce himself: that there is no pure – empirical or rational – starting-point of inquiry, 
since facts are always already coated into an interpretation; and what we do is moving 
around through interpretations; however, this is not vicious circularity, since (and here I 
am paraphrasing Richard Bernstein paraphrasing Peirce) the bigger a circle is the less 
vicious it is. The MT model of analogy is big enough to wish it a few more round trips. 
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